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loss in excess of 15 decibels was intended
to be a compensable disability." Id. at
107, 519 A.2d at 1352 (emphasis in original).
Now, a "disability" for occupational
deafness claims is merely a loss of hearing
in excess of 15 decibels as calculated in accordance with § 25A. An employee no
longer has to suffer loss of wages or be unable to perform his regular type of work.
In dissenting, Judge Garrity stated that
the majority's interpretation of § 25A is
unreasonable and contrary to public policy.
"The very raison d'etre for providing workmen's compensation in the wake of contracting an occupational disease or disorder
is to restore to a worker that portion of
lost wages due to the physical disability
caused by that occupation." Id. at 109,519
A.2d at 1353. Judge Garity felt that the
intent of § 25A is to provide the much
needed technical criteria for measuring occupational deafness and to provide a qualifying standard of 15 decibels as calculated
in the section for determining compensability.
While it is difficult to determine the
ramifications of the majority's interpretation of § 25A, the decision permits employees who suffer a compensable amount
of hearing loss to be eligible for worker's
compensation while continuing to draw full
wages. This decision suggests that it is the
deafness and not the disability that is to be
compensated.
- Randolph C. Baker

Hughes v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Board: PAYMENT OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS UNDER CONCURRENT
EMPLOYMENT.
In 1979 a Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation referee awarded death benefits
based upon his conclusion that, for the
purposes of wage computation, a private
corporation and the federal government
were concurrent employers of the decedent
under the Pennsylvania Worker's Compensation Act (hereinafter "Act"). The
referee's decision was subsequently reversed by the Worker's Compensation
Board (hereinafter "Board") which ruled
that the federal government was not an
"employer" within the meaning of the Act.
In Hughes v. Workmen's CompensationAppeals Board, _ _ Pa. Commw. __,513
A.2d 576 (1986), the claimant, Rebecca
Lane Hughes, sought a judicial interpretation of the word "employer" as it is used in
the Act.

David George Hughes died on July 3,
1977, from injuries sustained in an automobile accident that occurred while he
was operating a vehicle for his employer,
Salem Transportation Co. He was survived
by his wife (hereinafter "claimant") and a
minor daughter.
Claimant was granted death benefits on
July 18, 1979 based on the referee's findings that, at the time of his death, Hughes
was not only employed by Salem, but was
also a member of the United States Navy
and on active duty. Thus, Hughes was an
employee of both the federal government
and a private corporation. The referee considered the earnings from both employers
in computiI1g wages for the purpose of determining the proper compensation due
Hughes' survivors. Id. at __, 513 A.2d
at 577.
The referee's decision was based upon
Section 309(e) of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, Act of June 2,
1915, P.L. 736 as amended, 77 P.S. § 582(e)
which establishes a requirement "[t]hat
when an injured employee is concurrently
working under contracts with two or more
employers, his wages from all of such employers shall be considered as if earned
from the employer liable for compensation
under the Act."
The Board reversed, determining that
the federal government was not an employer of Hughes and determined compensation solely on Hughes' earnings with
Salem. In reaching such a decision, the
Board relied on Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
and David H. Greenwood, 63 Pa. Cornmw.
Ct. 1,437 A.2d 494 (1981). However, this
case was of little significance to Hughes
since it dealt with a member of the Pennsylvania National Guard who was injured
while participating in an annual training
program. The claimant, Greenwood filed
a worker's compensation claim which was
denied by the referee and subsequently reversed by the Board, thereby granting
worker's compensation benefits. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, citing lack
of subject matter jurisdiction by the Worker's Compensation Board, vacated the
order.
The Board's reliance on Pennsylvania
Nat'l Guard ignored the issue at hand:
"[w]hether the federal government was the
decedent's employer for the purpose of
computing the amount of compensation to
be awarded to his survivors and paid by
Salem pursuant to section 309(e), 77 P.S.
§ 582(e)." Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard dealt
neither with amount of compensation nor
with concurrent employers. Id.
In addition, the employer (Salem) and
the Board contended that the word "em-

ployer" pursuant to Section 103, 77 P.S.
§ 21 did not include the federal government. Salem argued that the absence of
specifically naming the federal government
in the statute provided evidence of an intention to exclude the federal government
from enjoying employer status. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court interpreted
this silence to mean:
[t]hat the obligations imposed on employers and the rights conferred upon
workers by the Act are not to apply
to the federal government or its employees. But Section 309(e), 77 P.S.
§ 582(e), imposes no obligation whatsoever upon an employer other than
an employer for whom the injured employee was working, which in this case
was Salem, not the federal government.
Hence, while the federal government could
not be an employer for purposes of regulation or subjection to the Act, it was nevertheless a concurrent employer for purposes
of determining compensation due survivors,
paid by Salem (the liable employer). It was
the intention of the Pennsylvania Legislature to broaden the definition of employer
under the Act so as to "[ clover as many employment relationships in Pennsylvania as
possible." Giannuzzi v. Donninger Metal
Prods., 585 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (W.D.
Pa. 1984).
Finally, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court denied Salem's request for a "set off"
(reducing Salem's payments to claimant
by the amount of federal compensation
available to claimant). There existed no
evidence to show that the claimant was receiving federal compensation. Therefore,
a set off was not warranted.
The consequences of the Hughes decision are to maintain liability on the primary employer for whom the employee
was aCtually working when injured, while
preserving claimant's benefits and wages
from the secondary employer (the federal
government).
Section 309(e) poses a heavy burden on
the private employer since the private employer not only assumes sole liability but it
also provides no methods of decreasing
that liability.
-Pablo Emilio Lense
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